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Alice: Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
here?
The Cat: That depends a good deal on where you want to get to.
Alice: I don't much care where.
The Cat: Then it doesn't much matter which way you go.
Alice: .. .so long as I get SOMEWHERE.
* Professor Emeritus, Marquette University Law School; Visiting Professor, Florida
A&M University College of Law, 2008-11. B.A., 1976, Urbana College; M.S. 1980, J.D.,
1983, University of Kentucky.
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The Cat: Oh, you're sure to do that, if only you walk long enough.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, American state and federal courts reported nearly
5,000 choice of law cases. 2 This no doubt represents only the tip of the
iceberg; it is difficult to know how much time and money are spent on
similar unreported cases at both the trial and appellate court levels.
When one takes into account the hours invested by both courts and
attorneys in choice of law disputes annually, the financial investment
is staggering.
Choice of law disputes have always presented challenges, but
until the 1960s, such disputes occurred far less often and involved far
less time than they do today. In that "life was simpler" world, all
courts followed traditional, First Restatement principles that made
choice of law decisions fairly predictable. For contracts, courts applied
lex loci contractus - the law of the place of contracting; for tort, lex loci
delicti, the law of the place of wrong or place of injury; and for property
disputes, lex situs, the law of the place where the property was located.
The principles were simple and predictable, albeit at times irrational.
Beginning in the 1960s, though, states began to abandon tradi-
tional choice of law analysis and to explore a variety of alternatives. A
latecomer to the choice of law revolution, the Florida Supreme Court
waited until 1980 to reject lex loci delicti for tort. It instead adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as its choice of law meth-
odology for tort issues, noting, "In doing so we join with numerous
other state courts which have adopted the more flexible, modern ap-
proach to this aspect of conflicts of law."3 This more "flexible" approach
has proven to be an unmitigated failure and, in a state like Florida
where the number of out-of-state visitors promises an unending supply
of choice of law cases, an expensive one as well.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 89-90 (Boston, Lee and
Shepard 1869) (1865).
2. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-
Fifth Annual Survey, 60 Ame. J. Comp. L. 291, 293 n.5 (2012). In diversity cases, federal
courts must apply the law of the state, including its choice of laws methodology. Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980). The Florida
Supreme Court came close to rejecting traditional analysis in a much earlier case, then
backed away. See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
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Florida scholars have from time to time tracked the state's suc-
cess with the Restatement (Second).4 Less than ten years after its
adoption, the authors of one article, after lamenting the courts' lack of
"expertise in conflicts doctrine," noted hopefully, "One would hope ...
that the courts work through the growing pains that accompany adop-
tion of a new doctrine."5 Two years later, another scholar referred to
the Florida Supreme Court's application of the Second Restatement as
a story of "disintegration, confusion, and collapse."6 And six years
later, in 1995, one scholar noted the "widespread confusion" created as
the state judiciary, lacking clear guidance from the state's highest
court, "has largely shifted for itself as it extemporizes solutions within
the notoriously open-ended standards of the Restatement."7
Since that first fifteen years of Florida's experience with the
Second Restatement, another seventeen years have passed. The Flor-
ida courts still do not seem to know what to do with the Restatement,
and attorneys are still left out in the cold, uncertain not only about the
law the court might apply to choice of law issues, but also about the
Restatement methodology the court might use, if any.
This article surveys the 150 cases decided in Florida under its
"flexible" approach. The survey clearly demonstrates that the Restate-
ment (Second) has proven unworkable, but it also demonstrates that
some significant patterns have emerged from the courts' decisions.
Those patterns can form the basis for a new choice of law approach
consisting primarily of rules with additional operational standards.
The rules, drawn from 150 cases decided by Florida courts since 1980,
would constitute a true "restatement" of Florida's current law.
II. CHOOSING FLEXIBILITY OVER PREDICTABILITY
Florida is not alone in its confusing approach to choice of law.
Some have suggested that courts over-reacted to the rigid simplicity of
the traditional choice of law approach and instead adopted approaches
4. See, e.g., Michael S. Finch, Choice of law Problems in Florida Courts: A
Retrospective on the Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REV. 653, 655-71 (1995); Harold
P. Southerland, A Screaming Comes Across the Sky - Tort Choice of Law Doctrine in Florida
under the Second Restatement of Conflicts, 40 MERCER L. REV. 781, 796-817 (1989).
5. Michael Finch and Lora Smeltzly, The Restatement Second and Conflict of Laws:
Extending the Bishop Approach to Problems in Contract, 16 STETSON L. REV. 261, 270
(1987).
6. Southerland, supra note 4, at 782. Professor Southerland's title refers to the first
line of Thomas Pynchon's novel, Gravity's Rainbow, which he describes as a novel of
"disintegration, confusion, and collapse" as he compares it to the Court's use of Restatement
(Second).
7. Finch, supra note 4, at 653.
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that offer too much flexibility.8 A brief history demonstrates that the
First Restatement's focus on predictability and uniformity led to irra-
tional results, but that the Second Restatement's focus on flexibility
has led to arbitrary and unpredictable decision-making.
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, First Restate-
ment principles came under increasing attack by judges, lawyers, and
scholars alike. The place of injury rule in particular drew criticism in
those circumstances when it seemed purely arbitrary. For example, if a
Florida plane with a Florida pilot carrying twelve Florida citizens took
off from Miami on its way to New York and happened to crash in South
Carolina, it made little sense for South Carolina law - the law of the
place of injury - to govern all of the disputed issues. Many courts
began to question such rigidity and devised a series of escape devices to
bypass the place of injury rule. Sometimes they rejected the law of the
place of injury under the "public policy" exception, i.e., refusing to ap-
ply another state's law when that law violated the forum's own public
policy.9 Other times they characterized the tort issue as a contractual
dispute10 or a dispute involving status" in order to justify the applica-
tion of some law other than the law of the place of injury. Some courts
chose to treat the disputed issue as one of procedure rather than as
substance, 12 thus permitting them to apply their own law.
During the 1960s, a number of states rejected outright the
traditional principles in favor of more flexible, interest-based rules.
Today, only ten states follow traditional principles for tort and only
twelve for contract.13 In contrast, twenty-four states now follow the
1971 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for tort and twenty-
8. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Adrift on the Sea of Indeterminacy, 75 IND. L.J.
527, 527 (2000); Alfred Hill, For a Third Conflicts Restatement - But Stop Trying to
Reinvent the Wheel, 75 IND. L.J. 535, 538 (2000); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts
Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403 (2000); Paul v. Nat'1 Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 551 (W. Va.
1986); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 235 (1993); Shirley
A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws "Restatements": Merging Judicial Discretion and
Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004-05).
9. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
10. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928). See
also Florida Steel Corp. v. Whiting Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1140, 1141 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 1988);
Herndon v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 530 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
11. See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continentl Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959).
12. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
13. Courts in the following states rely upon traditional principles for tort (T) and/or
contract (C): Alabama (T&C), Florida (C), Georgia (T&C), Kansas (T&C), Maryland (T&C),
New Mexico (T&C), North Carolina (T), Oklahoma (C), Rhode Island (C), South Carolina
(T&C), Tennessee (C), Virginia (T&C), West Virginia (T), and Wyoming (T&C).
Symeonides, supra note 2, at 308-09.
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three for contract disputes.14 This methodology incorporates a place of
injury rule as the presumptive rule for most tort cases and the place of
making for most contract cases, but it also calls for a consideration of a
number of other factors and interests. Its strength is its flexibility, ar-
guably taking into account various factors when they are most relevant
in the particular case. In fact, it has become so flexible that one would
be hard-pressed to predict the choice of law outcome in any dispute.
The Restatement (Second) can of course no longer be called
"modern" - it was completed over forty years ago15 - but no one can
dispute its flexibility. No one can dispute its complexity, either. Once
a court determines that the laws of at least two different states or
countries are in conflict, the Restatement (Second) requires a fairly
complicated three-step process to choose the applicable law.
One must first examine the Restatement to determine whether
it provides for a "presumptive" law that should apply - unless some
other state or country has a "more significant relationship" with the
event and the parties. For example, section 146 provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in §6
to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied. 16
The Restatement (Second) requires courts to apply the law of
the place of injury unless that presumption is overcome.
The second step requires the courts to consider certain key con-
tacts in making their evaluation. For example, for tort issues courts
should take into account not only the place of injury, but also the place
of the injury-causing conduct, "the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and . . . the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."17
Finally, and most importantly, once a court has determined the
presumptive rule and the key contacts, it is to apply the Second Re-
statement's Section 6 General Choice of Law Principles that pertain to
every kind of issue - contract, tort, property, etc. Those Principles re-
present the heart of the Restatement and demonstrate that this
"modern" methodology is a clear break from the old. While traditional
methodology asked "where," the new asks what, who, why, and how.
14. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 308-09.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs (1971).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs §146 (1971)(emphasis added).
17. Id. §145.
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Choice of law does not focus on counting contacts or determining where
a key event took place; instead, it examines the substance of each ar-
guably applicable law and asks why a state adopted that law, what
purpose it was designed to serve, why it might or might not apply in
each particular case, and how its specific application in each case
might or might not serve the law's purpose. In choice of law language,
it clearly incorporates Professor Brainerd Currie's "interest analy-
sis."1s The Restatement (Second) requires a court in all cases to
examine each of the Section 6 General Choice of law Principles:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.19
The result is that any court adopting the Restatement (Second)
must be committed not only to counting the contacts but also to con-
ducting a careful policy- and interest-based analysis. It is a process for
neither the faint of heart nor perhaps for busy judges.
While the First Restatement's greatest strength was its predict-
ability, today's Second Restatement demonstrates that predictability
has all but disappeared. Choice of law has become a litigator's para-
dise, a judge's playpen, a scholar's career. This article proposes an
alternative to Restatement (Second) for tort issues, an approach that
offers both predictability and rationality while basing its choice of law
approach on each state's own common law. It uses the state of Florida
as a focal point.
III. RE-STATING THE LAw
It is imperative that states find a way to make the choice of law
decision more predictable without sacrificing the advantages of a pol-
icy- and interest-based approach.20 Traditional choice of law rules,
incorporated into the First Restatement, offered the utmost in predict-
18. Professor Currie's writings date to the late 1950s and are most accessible in
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Duke University Press
1963).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs §6 (1971).
20. See Wiegand, supra note 8.
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ability. But those rules did not take into account the interests and
policies of the people and states involved. They were jurisdiction-se-
lecting, concerned only with where a particular event took place and
unconcerned with the content of the law prior to its application. It was
far easier to routinely apply the law of the place of injury, no matter
what it was and whether it made sense.
On the other hand, modern approaches like the Second Restate-
ment focus on the laws of each arguably concerned state and on the
interests of each state, the policies involved, the interests of the parties
themselves, and a host of other factors. If one could devise a set of
rules that make the choice of law simple and predictable yet incorpo-
rate the concerns reflected in the Second Restatement, one would have
combined the best of both approaches. And if those rules were based
on decisions already rendered by the state's courts, decisions that pre-
sumably reflect the state's policies and interests, the rules would
demonstrate respect for and a close adherence to the state's values and
its common law. Even if the courts of a given state have routinely mis-
applied their own interest-based analysis, a set of rules based on their
decisions would at least reflect what they have done and will likely
continue to do anyway. As one scholar has noted, courts will do what
they will, regardless of their articulated reasoning. 21
The best approach may be to bring such decision-making out in
the open and adopt a body of rules based on that decision-making.
Given that choice of law has historically developed through common
law, basing predictable rules on that common law is preferable to cre-
ating a new approach out of whole cloth. Reliance on the state's own
common law may also mean that the state's judiciary will find the new
approach both acceptable and understandable. What I am proposing
can best be described as a true "restatement" approach.
Currently, choice of law in this country is determined primarily
through Restatements of Conflict of Laws. Thirty-eight states rely
upon either the First or Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws in
making choice of law decisions, and the others have borrowed heavily
from such Restatements. 22 But what exactly is a Restatement? Is it
an attempt to survey and then summarize - re-state - existing law?
21. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REv. 1584, 1586 (1966).
22. For example, six states use the "significant contacts" test for either tort or contract,
or both, which often requires reliance on relevant contacts taken from the Second
Restatement. Ten states use a "combined modern" approach, again relying heavily on
aspects of the First or Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws. For a list of the states and
their approaches, see Symeonides, supra note 2, at 308-09.
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Or is it something else? The American Law Institute (ALI), founded in
1923, is responsible for drafting Restatements of the Law in a variety
of fields.23 Its first project was to "address uncertainty in the law
through a restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and
lawyers what the law was."2 4 In other words, the ALI would provide a
tool that would attempt to clarify the current state of the law.
Its work on the first Restatement of the Conflict of Laws did
just that. It reviewed the common law of courts from around the coun-
try, all of which followed some form of traditional choice of law
principles, then incorporated those principles into the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, published in 1934. Criticism of the first Restatement
began shortly thereafter, and just twenty years later, the ALI began
work on the Second Restatement. By this time, a number of scholars
had begun formulating their own ideas of how choice of law decisions
should be made, and many of these scholars participated in the ALI's
drafting process.25 The process lasted seventeen years and resulted in
a document that has been called "a total disaster," "chaos," "gibberish,"
"a veritable playpen for judicial policymakers," and "a conflicts mine
field in a maze constructed by professors drunk on theories."26 It is not
a "re-statement" of the law; rather, it is a combination of scholars'
ideas of what the law should be. Perhaps because it is so unfocused,
"[tirying to be all things to all people,"27 it can reasonably be consid-
ered a failure.
IV. FLORIDA'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Since its adoption of a "modern" approach to choice of law for
tort issues thirty-two years ago, Florida's state courts, its federal dis-
trict courts, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have reported
at least 150 cases that required litigation of choice of law tort issues.
23. About the American Law Institute, http://www.ali.org/doc/thisIsALI.pdf, at 1.
During its first twenty years, the American Law Institute drafted Restatements of the Law
for Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judgments, Property, Restitution, Security, Torts,
and Trusts. It has since expanded its focus to a number of additional Restatements
including second and third restatements in some areas. Id.
24. Id.
25. The ALI consists of "prominent American judges, lawyers, and teachers," elected to
membership in the organization. About the American Law Institute, supra note 23, at 1.
26. Gottesman, supra note 8, at 527; Hill, supra note 8, at 538; Juenger, A Third
Conflicts Restatement?, supra note 8, at 403; Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 551 (W. Va.
1986); JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 235; Wiegand,
supra note 8, at 4.
27. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 CoLum. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992).
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Ninety-eight of those - over sixty-five percent - have been decided in
the past fifteen years. In other words, rather than decreasing (as one
would expect if courts applied a consistent, predictable analysis to tort
issues), the number of such cases has increased. In addition, federal
court decisions - those in which the courts must guess at what the
state court would do2 8 - represent the majority of all such decisions; in
the federal district courts, seventy-four percent of all tort choice of law
cases decided since Florida adopted Restatement (Second) have arisen
just since 2000.
More than thirty years after Florida adopted the Restatement
(Second) for tort issues, its "more flexible, modern approach" has cre-
ated chaos. It is safe to say there is neither uniformity nor
predictability in this area of the law. It is also safe to say such chaos
has cost lawyers and their clients many thousands of dollars and the
court many thousands of hours. The state has continued to follow
traditional analysis for contract issues, a decision that seems wise con-
sidering its experience with a "modern" approach for torts.
It is unlikely that the Florida courts will improve in their appli-
cation of the Second Restatement. After all, they have had thirty-two
years to do so and have not. An analysis of 150 caseS29 reveals that
more than seventy percent of the time, courts fail to utilize the most
important part of Second Restatement analysis, the crucial Section 6
General Choice of law Principles.30 Not surprisingly then, given that
Section 6 is the only section that reflects an interest analysis approach,
courts rarely mention interest-analysis considerations. They refer to
the Second Restatement's presumptive rule less than forty percent of
the time. And over seventy percent of the time, they rely almost exclu-
sively on the Section 145 list of "contacts to be taken into account."
Most of the courts simply list some or all of those contacts, count them
up, and choose the law of the one that has the most contacts or the
28. See supra note 2.
29. See Appendix A for a list of the cases included in this analysis. It is, of course,
possible that a few cases have been overlooked, so the list does not purport to include every
such case during this thirty-year period. It does include most of them, however.
30. There are exceptions, though none of them include decisions by the state's highest
court. See e.g., Nelson v. Freightliner, LLC, 154 Fed. Appx. 98 (11th Cir. 2005); Piamba
Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1999); Estate of Miller v. Thrifty
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar
Earth Tech., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31457 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Medina v. American
Airlines, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18916 (S.D. Fla. 2005); In re Air Crash Near Cali,
Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14143 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Connell v.
Riggins, 944 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Mezroub v. Capella, 702 So. 2d 562 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 567 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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contacts that the court believes are most relevant, without explaining
their relevance. Most of the time, no attention is given to policies or
states' interests. The analysis becomes merely a matter of contact-
counting, bearing almost no relationship to the Second Restatement
while purporting to follow it.
Recently, one federal district court judge criticized the defend-
ants' choice of law argument for just this error:
"[Tihey mechanically tally up the four contacts listed in section
145(2).. . without even acknowledging the analysis required by sec-
tion 6.. . . [W]e cannot simply add up the factors ... and then apply
the law of the sovereign with the greatest numerical total ....
Rather, we must, as mandated ... ,turn to the factors delineated in
section 6 to determine which sovereign has the most significant
contacts.3 1
And yet, most Florida state and federal courts ignore section 6
altogether.
Despite this practice, Florida courts often reach a reasonable
result, no matter what methodology they purport to follow. They ap-
plied the law of the place of injury over sixty percent of the time, even
when they failed to mention the Restatement's strong place-of-injury
presumption. For out of state injuries, Florida courts overcame a natu-
ral inclination to apply their own law and instead applied Florida law
just over twenty-two percent of the time. Thus, place of injury takes
center stage in Florida decisions, just as it does in the Second Restate-
ment when properly applied. The courts were most often reluctant to
apply the law of the place of injury when the injury was the only con-
tact with that place and when that place was merely "fortuitous" or a
matter of "happenstance."3 2
A review of the cases since the Florida Supreme Court adopted
the Second Restatement for tort leads to two important conclusions.
First, applying the Restatement (Second) in the manner that its draft-
ers intended takes a significant amount of time and analysis, which
probably explains why courts rarely do so. One United States District
Court opinion included twenty pages dedicated to a careful Restate-
ment (Second) application.3 3 Another dedicated eighteen pages to the
31. Canon Latin Am., Inc. v. Lantech (C.R.) S.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6267, 12-17
(S.D. Fla. 2011).
32. See, e.g., Crowell v. Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc., 700 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Futch v. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc., 391 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
33. See Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Tech., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31457
(S.D. Fla. 2008).
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subject.34 On the other hand, courts that engage in simple contact-
counting have a much easier job of it, most of them devoting less than
one page to the choice of law discussion.
Second, one cannot predict either the methodology the court
will follow or the result it will reach. But - and this is the crucial
point - some "rules" have emerged from the court's analysis, which, if
acknowledged and adopted as part of a choice of law codification, will
make the court's task easier and its results more predictable. This
article next focuses on finding and articulating these rules - providing
a true re-statement for Florida courts.
V. A NEw APPROACH
It is clear that Florida - like many other states - requires a new
approach to choice of law. The Second Restatement, though it includes
a series of "presumptive" rules, is more accurately considered an "ap-
proach" to choice of law, a guideline or standard that courts consider in
making individual ad hoc decisions for every case. It appears that in
rejecting the rigid rules of the First Restatement, courts have over-re-
acted, opting for no rules at all. But rules have their place. They offer
predictability and can include exceptions that provide flexibility; a
number of choice of law scholars believe that the "pendulum has begun
swinging back" to a rule-based methodology.3 5
What sort of rules? Here again, there are options. Rules can be
made from whole cloth or from a combination of features from various
choice of law methodologies. The latter is the approach taken recently
by two different states in devising their own choice of law statutes. In
both cases, state law reform commissions drafted comprehensive
choice of law statutes which have now become law.3 6
Louisiana, the country's only civil code state, was the first to
pass a choice of law code. 7 The project took four years and received
approval from an advisory committee, then the Council of the Louisi-
34. See In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14143 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
35. Symeon Symeonides, Oregon's New Choice-of-Law Codification for Tort Conflicts:
An Exegesis, 88 OR. L. REV. 963, 970 (2009).
36. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 14, 3515-3549 (2009), effective in 1992, and Oregon
Laws Ch. 451 (S.B. 561), effective January 1, 2010. Both were drafted by state law reform
commissions comprised of members of all branches of government as well as members from
other legal organizations and law faculties in the state. In both cases Conflict of Law
Professor Symeon Symeonides served as the Reporter.
37. See LA. CIV. CODE Book 4, arts. 3515-3549 (2012).
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ana State Law Institute, and finally the Louisiana legislature.38 The
code reflects threads of modern choice of law methodologies drawn
from a variety of sources and has been met with mixed reviews. 39
Oregon recently completed choice of law legislation for contract
and tort disputes.40 It too began with proposed legislation drafted by a
state law reform commission and was then adopted first for contracts
in 2001 and then for tort in 2010.41 According to one of its principal
architects, the new tort rules "drew on the vast experience of American
courts in deciding tort conflicts in the four decades since the choice-of-
law revolution began, as well as the experience of other jurisdictions in
drafting rules for tort conflicts." Those jurisdictions included eighteen
foreign countries, international conventions, the Second Restatement,
and a host of other sources. 42 The result is a body of rules governing
most issues, as well as a Second Restatement-like approach for those
issues not addressed by the rules.
What neither state has done is to adopt choice of law legislation
based on its own common law. Under this approach, a law reform com-
mission or legislative committee would examine the state's common
law history under whatever methodology the state has previously
adopted, try to find patterns for at least those issues that arise with
some regularity, and, based on those findings, develop choice of law
rules, i.e., individual state "re-statements," to govern key choice of law
areas in the state. Such statutes, based on the state's own common law,
presumably already incorporate state policies. In Florida, for example,
courts have clearly used methodological shortcuts to reach choice of
law results, but the results themselves are surprisingly consistent.
Thus, courts seem to have reached the "right" decision regardless of
methodology, and those decisions most likely took into account under-
lying policies and interests - the sort of decisional concerns that courts
routinely incorporate.
A law reform commission formed under the authority of the
state's legislature with members representing many state constituen-
cies would thus honor the efforts of the judicial branch while engaging
38. See Wiegand, supra note 8, at 13. For a fuller discussion of the Louisiana project,
see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992).
39. For a discussion of the Louisiana choice of law code and its critics, see Wiegand,
supra note 8, at 13-16.
40. See Symeonides, supra note 35. See also James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon's Conflicts
Law Applicable to Contracts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397 (2002).
41. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§81.100-81.135 (2010) (contract choice of law); 2009 Or. Laws
Ch. 451 (S.B. 561) (torts and non-contractual claims).
42. Symeonides, supra note 35, at 973 n.50.
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as well representatives of the legislative and executive branches and a
number of other state representatives. The result would be a written
product that reflects the state's policies and jurisprudence - what I
have termed a "true 'restatement' of the law" that merges judicial dis-
cretion and legislative endorsement. 4 3
In the meantime, if the law reform process seems too daunting
for states, or if the process promises to take too long, the state's judici-
ary itself might adopt a body of choice of law "rules" for recurring
issues, based on their own precedent in similar cases. Those rules may
serve as the basis for statutory reform at a later date.
The goal is to provide choice of law predictability, uniformity,
and certainty in those areas that dominate the choice of law terrain.
As expressed by one frustrated New York judge:
The time has come . . . for us to endeavor to minimize what some
have characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case approach by laying
down guidelines, as well as we can, for the solution of ... conflicts
problems. We have had sufficient experience with enough varia-
tions of the patterns of fact and law in this type of case to permit us
to acknowledge that several choice of law rules governing different
types of fact patterns have been forged by our recent decisions. 44
Reviewing the choice of law history of just one state - Florida
- demonstrates that such an approach is workable and promises to
increase predictability in this chaotic area of the law. Below are a few
of the "rules" that Florida's judiciary or a law reform commission might
adopt for issues relating to torts.
VI. THE RULE OF THE COMMON DOMICILE
One of the clear trends emerging from the conflicts revolution is the
widespread acceptance of the notion that, when the tortfeasor and
the victim are domiciled in the same state and the conflict in ques-
tion involves loss-distribution (as opposed to conduct-regulation)
issues, the law of the common domicile should govern, even if both
the conduct and the injury occurred in another state.45
The rule of common domicile dictates that when both or all of
the parties are from the same state, the law of that state should be
applied, no matter where the tort took place. This rule makes sense.
The parties have all chosen to affiliate with a particular state. They
43. See Wiegand, supra note 8, at 2.
44. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 403 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J., concurring).
45. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2007: Twenty-
First Annual Survey, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 243, 256 (2008).
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benefit from its laws and bear the concomitant responsibilities. They
have impliedly agreed to abide by its laws. In addition, that state is
the one state that would have the greatest interest in the parties'
welfare.
In addition, the common domicile rule has a rich history.
Nearly forty years ago, it was one of the three rules adopted by the
New York Court of Appeals for resolving cases involving automobile
guest statutes. The rule continues there today and not simply for
guest statute disputes. Its origin can be traced to 1963 in Babcock v.
Jackson,4 6 a case that involved a New York driver, a New York passen-
ger, and a one-car accident in Ontario. Under New York law the
passenger could have sued the driver for ordinary negligence, but On-
tario's guest statute imposed a higher standard of negligence. The
New York Court of Appeals, in rejecting the traditional place-of-injury
rule, noted,
[I]t is New York, the place where the parties resided, where their
guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to
end.. .which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for
application of its law. . . . the rights and liabilities of the parties
which stem from their guest-host relationship should remain con-
stant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place
to place. 47
In another guest statute case six years later, New York's high-
est court again focused on the parties' domicile, holding that New York
law applied in a case in which the car accident occurred in Michigan
and involved a New York driver and a New York passenger. 48 New
York, the Court held, "has the only real interest in whether recovery
should be granted."4 9 Perhaps more important than the Court's major-
ity opinion, however, was Judge Fuld's concurring opinion. He
concluded that the Court had had enough experience with guest stat-
ute cases to "permit us to acknowledge that several choice of law rules
governing different types of fact patterns have been forged by our re-
cent decisions."5 0 The first of his three rules (now known as the
Neumeier Rules named after the 1972 case in which the court adopted
them5 1 ) was the common domicile rule: when the driver and passenger
"are domiciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the
46. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
47. Id. at 284-85.
48. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
49. Id. at 398.
50. Id. at 403.
51. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
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law of that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to his guest."52
The common domicile rule applied initially only to guest statute
cases. The rationale was that guest statutes are "loss-allocating"
rather than "conduct regulating." They assume a tort has taken place;
the statute merely determines who should bear the loss as between the
two parties. A modern example of a loss-allocating rule is charitable
immunity. As with guest statutes, a charitable immunity rule applies
only after a tort has taken place and it determines whether or not the
tortfeasor charity must pay; it determines how the loss will be allo-
cated. It makes sense to apply the law of the common domicile since it
is the only "interested" state, i.e., it is the only state that will be af-
fected by the loss allocating dispute between its two citizens. In
addition, the common domicile rule represents "prevailing judicial
practice in the United States," as well as a growing trend worldwide.53
Issues relating to standards of conduct, i.e., conduct-regulating
laws, on the other hand, are designed to regulate the tortious conduct
itself. Speed limits are perhaps the simplest example. When tortious
conduct takes place in a foreign state, as when a driver is speeding,
then the state where the conduct takes place is likely to take an inter-
est in keeping its roads safe. The common domicile, in other words, is
not the only state with an interest in the dispute. Thus, an exception
to the common domicile rule might occur when the conflict of law issue
involves a clearly conduct-regulating law such as the proper standard
of care. In that case, though the parties may both be from one state,
when they are in another state and violate that state's conduct-regulat-
ing rule, the conduct-regulating rule should govern.
Since the adoption of the common domicile rule for guest stat-
ute cases, New York courts have adopted it for other loss-allocating
rules as well, and other states have begun to follow suit. In 1993, in a
worker's compensation case, New York's highest court declared that
the rules adopted for guest statute cases "could, in appropriate cases,
apply as well to other loss allocation conflicts."54 By the end of 2011,
state supreme courts that had rejected traditional analysis applied the
law of the common domicile eighty-five percent of the time.55
52. Id. The other two rules address situations in which the driver and passenger do
not share a common domicile.
53. Symeonides, supra note 35, at 1001.
54. Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1993).
55. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 313.
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One of those cases involved two Florida citizens, a husband and
wife involved in a car accident in New Jersey.56 The passenger wife
sued her driver husband, permissible under the law of New Jersey,
which had abandoned inter-spousal immunity. However, based on
both their common domicile and their marital relationship, centered in
Florida, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied Florida's loss-allocat-
ing law of inter-spousal immunity.57
A. Car and Plane Accidents
Florida cases involve a variety of tort issues, but more than one-
third of all choice of law tort cases decided since Florida's adoption of
modern analysis arise from car or plane crashes. This includes cases
that involve insurance-related issues and rental car company liability
so long as the disputed issues are grounded in tort.5 8
The majority of car and plane cases involved parties from differ-
ent states, the split domicile scenario. However, of the fifty car and
plane cases surveyed, sixteen involved parties sharing a common domi-
cile. If one can discern clear patterns from these cases, it is possible
that one can begin to fashion a rule applicable to other cases as well.
Although Florida courts have applied the Restatement (Second)
inconsistently, they have been fairly consistent in recognizing that the
place of injury is often fortuitous and that the law of the common domi-
cile should be applied. In Crowell v. Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc.,69
the Crowells, Florida residents, were the subjects of a hit and run acci-
dent in Georgia. The truck which hit them bore the insignia of a
Florida trucking company. The court held that Florida law should ap-
ply, noting, "Florida decisions have repeatedly held that the
56. See Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187 (N.J. 1986).
57. However, in Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme
Court held that "both public necessity and fundamental rights require judicial abrogation of
the [interspousal immunity] doctrine."
58. It does not include cases in which the courts held that contract rather than tort law
governed the dispute. Often, it's hard to tell the difference. For example, in Herndon v.
Gov't Employees Ins. Co., GEICO argued that the issue of prejudgment interest on an
uninsured motorist payment is grounded in tort and subject to the significant relationship
test. The court instead treated it as a contract dispute governed by lex loci contractus. See
also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clohessy, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998). This article focuses
exclusively on tort issues, because Florida has retained traditional analysis (place of
contracting) for contract disputes. Generally, applying traditional analysis to contract
issues provides far more predictability than applying Restatement (Second). Currently,
twelve states follow traditional analysis for contract disputes: Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 308-09.
59. 700 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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happenstance of an accident's occurrence in another state does not cre-
ate significant contacts for the purpose of applying that state's law in a
conflict of law dispute."60
In Krasnosky v. Meredith,61 two Florida residents were re-
turning to Florida after a trip to visit relatives in Atlanta. Their car
crashed into a tree in Georgia. In a suit by the Florida passenger
against the Florida driver, the court refused to apply Georgia's guest
statute, instead opting for Florida's statute that required a showing of
only simple negligence. Similarly, in Harris v. Berkowitz,6 2 two Flor-
ida residents were returning to Florida from a Maine summer camp,
when their car crashed into a tree in Maine. The court had to deter-
mine whose wrongful death statute to apply. It chose Florida's.
Despite the fact that the men had attended summer camp in Maine
and the accident occurred there, the court still found the place of injury
"fortuitous." Maine, it said, bore "little relation to the occurrence," par-
ticularly since both parties were from Florida.
Florida courts have applied the common domicile rule even
when the parties are from a state other than Florida. In Leinhart v.
Jurkovich,63 an Illinois university student in Florida for a swim meet
sued his university and Illinois van driver when the team's van was
involved in an accident on Florida roads. The court refused to apply
Florida's no-fault insurance law, opting instead for Illinois law.
In fact, the court applied the law of the common domicile in nine
out of eleven automobile crash cases involving parties from the same
state. 64 An exception is Jones v. Cook,65 in which a Florida resident
was struck by a vehicle in Georgia where she worked. The defendant
was also a Florida resident. Rather than apply Florida's statute of lim-
60. Id. at 123.
61. 447 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
62. 433 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
63. 882 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
64. The court applied the law of the common domicile in Rivas v. Ford Motor Co., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7535 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Leinhart v. Jurkovich, 882 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); Mezroub v. Capella, 702 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Crowell v. Clay
Hyder Trucking Lines, 700 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Beattey v. College Centre,
613 So.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)(treating students attending college in New York as
New York residents); Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Pennington v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Harris v. Berkowitz, 433
So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
65. 587 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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itations under Second Restatement analysis,66 the court applied
Georgia law. It did not mention the crucial Section 6 of the Restate-
ment, noting merely that the plaintiff worked in Georgia and the
defendant "did business in Georgia on a regular basis." It did not men-
tion why that might have given Georgia any interest in having its law
apply. The court might have relied upon Section 146, comment e, of
the Restatement (Second) for support, though it did not. Comment e
provides that the presumptive law of the place of injury "is most likely
to be applied when the injured person has a settled relationship to that
state, either because he is domiciled or resides there or because he does
business there."67 The court might have treated place of business as a
proxy for domicile, which Section 145 itself does when it lists as a rele-
vant contact either domicile or place of business.68 In fact, in a similar
case the court had applied Florida's statute of limitations in a lawsuit
filed by a Florida passenger against his Florida driver for an accident
in Georgia. The difference between these two cases is that in the latter
case, neither party worked in Georgia; they were merely attending a
conference there.6 9
The second exception to Florida's application of the common
domicile rule for automobile cases is Hoffman v. Ouellette.70 There,
both parties were from Quebec, yet the court applied Florida law. The
court's decision may have been based on two factors. First, the parties
resided in Florida approximately five months a year and the accident
occurred in Florida. Second, Florida courts have demonstrated an un-
derstandable aversion to applying the law of another country, and,
although the court failed to refer to it, Section 6 of the Second Restate-
ment specifically directs courts to consider the "ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied."71
The law of the common domicile has been applied as well in
plane crash cases. This article does not address mass tort cases involv-
ing large commercial planes. Such cases inevitably make choice of law
more complex. In consolidated cases, i.e., cases that began by different
plaintiffs in different states and consolidated for pre-trial purposes,
courts may have to apply different bodies of law to different plaintiffs.
66. Florida adopted Second Restatement analysis for determining where a cause of
action "arose" under Florida's borrowing statute, FLA. STAT. § 95.10, in Bates v. Cook, Inc.,
509 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1987).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 146 comment e (emphasis added).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 145.
69. Mezroub v. Capella, 702 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
70. 798 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
71. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(g).
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A number of choice of law proposals have surfaced to address the mass
tort case, but to date mass torts present challenges yet to be resolved
(and outside the scope of this article). 72 This article focuses only on
cases that involve smaller non-commercial planes.
In Proprietors Insurance Co. v. Valsecchi,73 a plane crashed in
North Carolina. The flight began and was to end its journey in Florida.
Three men, all temporary residents of Florida attending college in
Florida, were killed, and their estates sued the plane's Florida owners
and lessors. As the court notes, "North Carolina's only connection to
the event and the parties was the purely adventitious circumstance
that the aircraft crashed" there.74 Although the three victims were not
necessarily domiciled in Florida, the court noted that they were Florida
residents, and "Florida's interest lies in the protection of its residents
from excessive financial burdens ... ."75 The court applied Florida law.
Other plane crash cases involving parties sharing a common
domicile led to similar results. In Watts v. National Insurance Under-
writers,76 the plane crashed in Louisiana. It was owned by Florida
defendants and both the pilot and passengers were Florida residents.
The court found the site of the crash fortuitous and applied Florida
law.
None of the common domicile car or plane crash cases involved
a conduct-regulating rule. All were loss-allocating, i.e., they did not
implicate any conduct-regulating rule of the place of injury. Thus, the
place of injury had no particular interest in how the case would be re-
solved when all the parties were from another state. For example, in
Crowell, the issue involved "ownership of the ... vehicle."77 Krasnosky
involved a guest statute. Both Harris and Proprietors Insurance in-
volved wrongful death recovery limits and, in addition, Proprietors
Insurance involved comparative/contributory negligence and the appli-
cation of Florida's dangerous instrumentality (vicarious liability)
doctrine.7 8 Watts, too, involved the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine.
72. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d
594 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the choice of law problem for mass torts, see Larry
Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996).
73. 435 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
74. Id. at 295.
75. Id. at 297.
76. 540 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
77. 700 So. 2d at 122.
78. Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine has been the subject of a number of
conflict of laws cases. That number will undoubtedly decline or stop altogether since the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the doctrine imposing strict vicarious
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Adopting a common domicile rule for tort cases makes good
sense, at least for loss-allocating issues. It is generally what the Flor-
ida courts have done anyway and it thus pays homage to both
precedent and to the Second Restatement that focuses much of its at-
tention on the interests of the relevant states and on the domicile of
the parties. Although the Restatement initially presumes that the law
of the place of injury will apply in tort cases,79 the law of another state
will be applied when, "with respect to the particular issue," it has the
most significant relationship with the parties and the occurrence. 0
Relevant Restatement contacts under section 145 include the
place of conduct and the place of injury, but when the "particular issue"
in dispute does not focus on the conduct but rather on who will pay for
the loss, then place of conduct and place of injury become less signifi-
cant in common domicile cases. Other Restatement contacts include
the domicile of the parties and the place where their relationship is
centered, though most agree that in cases involving unplanned torts
between strangers, there is no pre-existing relationship. Thus, of all
the contacts listed in section 145, domicile appears the most relevant
for common domicile cases involving loss-allocating issues.
The key "choice of law principles" found in section 6 of the Re-
statement reinforce domicile as a significant factor in common domicile
cases. The principles include:
* relevant policies of the forum and other interested states and the
"relative interests of those states in the determination of the par-
ticular issue;"
* "basic policies underlying the particular field of law;"
* "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result;" and
* "ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied."8
liability on car rental companies has been preempted by the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C.
§ 30106. See Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008). The
law of the common domicile was applied in Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So.
2d at 413, which also involved the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Pennington v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 456 So. 2d at 507, involved interspousal immunity, a loss-allocating
issue. That doctrine too has now been abrogated. See Waite v. Waite, 618 S. 2d 1360 (Fla.
1993).
79. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 146, 147.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 146.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 6 (1971) (emphasis added). Other
section 6 factors are less important for unplanned torts. The "protection of justified
expectations" applies primarily in contract cases when the parties actually have
expectations. The "needs of the interstate and international systems" are best served when
simple, neutral, and predictable rules reduce the amount of time and expense involved in
choice of law decisions.
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Thus, applying a common domicile rule for all cases except
those involving a standard of care does not represent any change in
result. It simply means that courts and lawyers will spend less time
and money in reaching that result. It is logical and predictable.
B. Other Common Domicile Cases
The common domicile rule may also be a good rule for cases that
do not involve car or plane crashes. There is nothing inherently special
about cases involving car or plane crashes such that the common domi-
cile rule should be reserved exclusively for them. In the few Florida
common domicile cases that did not involve car or plane crashes, the
courts applied the law of the common domicile regardless of whether
the issue was loss-allocating or conduct-regulating.82 Just as with car
and plane crash cases, the parties in a common domicile case have all
chosen to affiliate with a particular state and have impliedly agreed to
abide by its laws. They benefit from those laws and should bear the
burden as well. In addition, that common state is the one state that
likely would have the greatest interest in the parties' welfare.
VII. SPLIT DOMICILE CASES
A. Car and Plane Accidents
The majority of Florida choice of law decisions for cases involv-
ing car crashes involves parties from different states. Of the twenty-
five split domicile cases analyzed,83 the court applied the law of the
82. See Central Trust Co. v. Shepard (In re Shepard), 29 B.R. 928 (1983 Bankr. LEXIS
6201); Robinson v. Merkle, 700 So. 2d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (all parties resided in
West Virginia at the time of the alleged medical malpractice though doctor later moved to
Florida); Walsh v. Arrow Air, Inc., 629 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
83. Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Thrifty Rent-
A-Car Sys., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Potts v. Budget Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27536 (N.D. Fla. 2005); Estate of Miller v Ford Motor Co., 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30811 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Barton v. Hertz Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (M.D.
Fla. 1999); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elec. Sys., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Hertz
Corp. v. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So.
2d 1109 (Fla. 1981); Connell v. Riggins, 944 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Sierra v.
A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., 863 So. 2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Jenkins v.
Rockwood, 820 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Brown v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc.,
707 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Deemer v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 704 So.
2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Rosenberger, 699 So. 2d 713
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 587 So. 2d 483
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Commerce Ins. Co. v. Atlas Rent A Car, Inc., 585 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 567 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Barker v. Anderson, 546 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Avis
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place of injury in nineteen of them, or seventy-six percent of the time.8 4
But when one of the parties resided in the same state as the place of
injury (in fifteen cases), the court applied the law of the place of injury
every time.85
Applying the law of the place of injury in split domicile cases
can be justified in a number of ways. First and most importantly,
when the parties are from different states, the place of injury is likely
the only place with which all parties have chosen to associate. Second,
when there is a car crash the place of injury does provide some services
such as police, ambulance, and hospital services. Third, the choice of
place of injury furthers at least two of the seven Restatement choice of
law principles: it promotes certainty, predictability, and uniformity of
result and it furthers the needs of the interstate systems. Choosing
between the laws of different states can result in interstate friction,
and choosing one's own law appears parochial.
Several plane crashes involved split domicile as well. Unless
the crash involved large, consolidated cases86 or a crash over foreign
soil,87 Florida courts have applied the law of the place of injury for split
domicile cases.88 When the parties do not share a common domicile,
conflict of laws decisions become more difficult and the place of injury
can serve as a default. That is not always the wisest decision because
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Abrahantes, 517 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); AIU Ins. Co. v.
Reese, 498 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Ploor v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 So. 2d
1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1985); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 473 So. 2d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Andrews v. Continental Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Steele v. Southern Truck Body Corp., 397 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Decker v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
84. See Potts, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 27536; Estate of Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at 30811; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 802; Hertz Corp., 453 So. 2d at 12; State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d at 1109; Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1174; Sierra, 863 So. 2d
at 358; Jenkins, 820 So. 2d at 426; Brown, 707 So. 2d at 394; Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 699
So. 2d at 713; Aetna Cas. &Surety Co., 587 So. 2d at 483; Commerce Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d at
1084; Barker, 546 So. 2d at 449; Avis Rent-A-Car, 517 So. 2d at 25; AIU, 498 So. 2d at 966;
Ploor, 474 So. 2d at 1280; Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 473 So. 2d at 220; Steele, 397 So. 2d at 1209;
Decker, 392 So. 2d at 965.
85. See Estate of Miller, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 30811; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 813 F.
Supp. at 802; Hertz Corp., 453 So. 2d at 12; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d at
1109; Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1174; Sierra, 863 So. 2d at 358; Brown, 707 So. 2d at 394;
Commerce Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d at 1084; Barker, 546 So. 2d at 449; Avis Rent-A-Car, 517 So.
2d at 25; AIU, 498 So. 2d at 966; Ploor, 474 So. 2d at 1280; Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 473 So. 2d
at 220; Steele, 397 So. 2d at 1209; Decker, 392 So. 2d at 965.
86. See In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December 20, 1995, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1340
(S.D. Fla. 1998).
87. See Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1999).
88. See Emmart v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 659 F. Supp. 843 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Peoples
Bank & Trust Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 598 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Aerovias
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., Avianca, Inc. v. Tellez, 596 So. 2d 1193 (Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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when a dispute arises from a plane crash, place of injury - if that is the
only contact - seems quite irrelevant. A plane can crash anywhere
and, unlike car crashes, airline passengers have not intentionally en-
tered into a particular state willingly and knowingly, relying upon its
public services along the way.
Nevertheless, Florida's experience with such cases can serve as
the foundation for choice of law rules. In eleven plane crash cases, five
were common domicile (Florida) cases, and the courts applied Florida
law.89 Three of the other cases arose from one large plane crash in
Colombia in 1995,90 and because the courts were able to find signifi-
cant contacts with Florida, they were able to avoid applying foreign
law and, in all three instances, applied Florida law. In two of the Co-
lombia crashes, the courts noted that the largest number of passengers
were Florida residents and that the plane had taken off from a Florida
airport.9 1 In the third, in addition to the plane's departure from Flor-
ida, the court noted that two of the pilot defendants were Florida
residents. In addition, Florida and Colombia laws were the only ones
placed in contention. 92
The remaining three air crash cases involved parties from dif-
ferent states and the crashes were in the United States.9 3 In all of
them, though, one of the parties resided in the same state in which the
crash occurred, so the courts applied the place of injury. In addition, in
all three cases, the decision to apply the law of the place of injury was
made easier because the place of injury was not fortuitous. The planes
crashed in the same state from which they departed and to which they
intended to return. Thus, the parties intentionally affiliated with that
state in some significant way.
89. See Schipper v. U.S., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136980 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (Federal Tort
Claims Act case applying Texas' Restatement (Second) analysis); Watts v. Nat'l Ins.
Underwriters, 540 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So.
2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (plaintiffs treated as Florida residents because of their
student status there; no party argued for application of their home state's law); Hayden v.
Krusling, 531 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (involving crash in Gulf of Mexico; issue of
maritime v. Florida law); Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980)
(impliedly choosing Florida law by rejecting lex loci delicti analysis).
90. Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Air
Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re Air
Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14143 (S.D. Fla.
1997)(Colombia crash).
91. See In re Air Crash, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 and U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14143.
92. See Piamba Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1272.
93. Boromei v. U.S., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27859 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Emmart v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 659 F. Supp. 843 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 598 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
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One can develop a rule from these decisions that reflects the
values articulated by the courts as well as those associated with the
Second Restatement. The Restatement's presumptive place of injury
rule should not carry much weight when a plane crashes mid-flight,
and even the place of the negligent conduct may be irrelevant. For ex-
ample, when the negligent conduct takes place in the air - perhaps
because the pilots are busy with their smartphones and ignoring their
duties - the state over which such behavior takes place should not
thereby develop an interest in having its law applied. In such a case,
where the plane finally crashes is also fortuitous. Then the only rele-
vant Restatement contacts94 are where the parties are domiciled,
incorporated, or work; and where the parties' relationship is centered.
When a small plane crashes and the parties all share a domi-
cile, Florida courts should ignore the place of injury and apply - as
they have - the law of the common domicile. Schipper, Bishop, Hay-
den, Proprietors Insurance, and Watts so hold.95
If the parties do not share a domicile, courts should apply (and
have applied) the place of injury if one of the parties resides in that
state. This rule is reflected in Boromei, Emmart, and Peoples Bank &
Trust.96
These results make sense and could easily be adopted as sensi-
ble, effective, predictable rules for similar cases.
This leaves those cases in which the parties' domiciles differ
and none of the parties reside at the place of injury or death. These
cases could receive thorough Restatement (Second) analysis or some
modified version of it. In Florida, the only crash that would receive
such analysis is In re Air Crash,97 involving the 1995 crash in Colom-
bia. In applying Florida law, the court placed some weight on the fact
that the plane had taken off from a Florida airport. However, this fact
may present problems, and courts should be wary of adopting a rule
that places great value on where a plane takes off. For example, one
who departs from Tallahassee may have to fly through Atlanta to get
to Miami. If a plane crashes after takeoff from Atlanta, should Georgia
law apply? Tallahassee residents already resent having to fly north to
get south, and it seems quite unfair to charge them with Georgia law
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §145.
95. See Schipper, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 136980; Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 999; Hayden,
531 F. Supp. at 468; Proprietors Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d at 290; Watts, 540 F. Supp. at 488.
96. See Boromei, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 27859; Emmart, 659 F. Supp. at 843;
Peoples Bank & Trust, 598 F. Supp. at 377.
97. 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
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as a result. Finding another Florida contact would make this result
fairer, and Florida cases reflect this analysis, though unarticulated.
B. Other Split Domicile Cases
Other than cases involving car and plane crashes, Florida
courts decided sixty-two split domicile cases. In fifty-nine of those, one
of the parties was domiciled in the state of injury. In nearly eighty-five
percent of those (fifty of the fifty-nine cases), the courts applied the law
of the place of injury. In the remaining cases, the choice of some other
law can usually be explained by unique circumstances. For example, in
Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp.,98 the place of injury was Brazil
and the courts have demonstrated reluctance to apply foreign law. In
other cases, the injury was felt in more than one state, so the court
applied the law of the place of conduct instead.99 Two cases involved
an issue for which specific Second Restatement comments indicate that
the place of conduct should ordinarily determine the applicable law. 0 0
Department of Corrections v. McGhee'01 involved the sovereign immu-
nity and duty of the Florida Department of Corrections, and the court
applied Florida law. Moreover, when the place of conduct is merely
"fortuitous," that is, where the injury could have occurred in any state
(such as a mid-air plane crash), the court is less likely to give much
weight to the place of injury. 102 It is notable that in the nine cases in
which the court did not apply the law of the place of injury, it instead
applied the law of the place of conduct seven times and in each of those
cases, one of the parties was domiciled at the place of conduct.
VIII. ISSUES INVOLVING MARITAL STATUS
Some tort cases indirectly involve the marital status of the par-
ties. They include interspousal immunity and loss of consortium
claims. The rule of common domicile could surely apply here when both
98. 637 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
99. See Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 753 F.
Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
100. See Merriman v. Convergent Bus. Sys., Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10528 (N.D.
Fla. 1993) and Trumpet Vine Investments, N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d
1110 (11th Cir. 1996), both citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §145
comment f ("place of injury is less significant in the case of fraudulent misrepresentations
... and of such unfair competition as consists of false advertising and the misappropriation
of trade values.")
101. 653 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
102. See Nelson v. Freightliner, LLC, 154 Fed. Appx. 98 (11th Cir. 2005) (truck driver
killed by carbon monoxide fames as he slept in the cab of his truck).
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parties are from the same state. Alternatively, one could argue that the
court should apply the law of the place where the marital relationship
is based. The Restatement (Second) specifically directs that, for all in-
tra-family immunity issues, the "applicable law will usually be the
local law of the state of the parties' domicile." 0 3 However, that section
also notes that this rule applies "only if the suit is between members of
a family," and not when it involves third persons, for example, when
"an injured spouse brings suit against a third person, and [the third
person] in turn seeks contribution from the other spouse on the ground
that the latter was partly responsible for the injury."104 Understanda-
bly, when a third party from another state is involved, the family's
domicile does not automatically have a greater interest in the result.
However, again in the interest of predictability and simplicity, would
such an across-the-board rule make sense?
Florida's courts have had experience with this issue. In Avis
Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. Abrahantes,105 two Miami men were in-
jured in the Cayman Islands when their jeep overturned. They sued
the car rental company. Although the Florida court applied the law of
the place of injury, Cayman Islands, to the main case, it applied Flor-
ida law to the wives' loss of consortium claims.' 06 Citing cases from
other states, the Florida court found that "[claims for loss of consor-
tium are governed by the law of the state where the marriage is
domiciled. . . ."1o7 In Pennington v. Dye,108 an Ohio couple was involved
in a car accident in Florida. The issue was interspousal immunity.
The court easily found that Ohio law should apply for a variety of rea-
sons. Both the married couple and the other driver were from Ohio
and had been vacationing in Florida, and their insurance policies were
all issued in Ohio. The court noted, "A growing number of courts have
held that the issue of contribution should be decided by the law of the
state where all of the parties reside rather than by the law of the state
where the accident occurred." 09 Although this case was easy, given
that all the parties were from Ohio, the court might have added that
when the issue of contribution is bound up with interspousal immu-
nity, the law of the spousal domicile should be applied.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §169.
104. Id. §169 cmts. a, c.
105. 517 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
106. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. Abrahantes, 559 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
107. Id. at 1264.
108. 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
109. Id. at 510.
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IX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
By examining Florida common law, one could also fashion a
rule that governs a recurring workers' compensation issue. The rule
might be that when an out-of-state employer hires an out-of-state
worker who is injured while working in Florida and who collects
worker compensation from his own state, the worker may not thereaf-
ter use the Florida courts to sue his employer in tort. The rule would
reflect a strong Florida policy regarding employer immunity.
Three cases demonstrate the courts' acknowledgment of this
policy. In Garcia v. Public Health Trust of Dade County,110 a Spanish
citizen and employee of Iberia Airlines was injured while in Miami,
Florida. Iberia's physician treated him in a Miami hospital. Although
he was compensated under Spanish workers compensation law, he
sued the airline and physician in tort. The court applied Florida work-
ers compensation law which did not permit double recovery, even
though Spanish law would have permitted the additional damages.
"Florida has articulated a strong public policy with respect to employer
immunity for work related injuries. Because Spanish law allows suit
against employers, Spanish law would contravene strong public policy
of the forum state.""' The court cited Florida Statute section 440.09
as support:
Where an accident happens while the employee is employed else-
where than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents
to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or
his dependents shall be entitled to compensation... .However, if an
employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of
any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as
to permit a total compensation for the same injury greater than is
provided herein. 112
A similar result occurred in Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Har-
gis, 1 13 where an out-of-state contractor hired an Indiana sub-
contractor to work on a project in Florida. The sub-contractor in turn
hired an Illinois worker who was injured while working in Florida.
The worker collected workers compensation benefits under Illinois law,
and then sued the contractor in tort. The court held that, because the
110. 841 F.2d 1062 (11th Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 1066.
112. The current statute provides that "if an employee receives compensation or
damages under the laws of any other state, the total compensation for the injury may not be
greater than is provided in this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (1)(d) (2010).
113. 698 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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injury and allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Florida, the contrac-
tor was immune from liability under Florida law.
In Plath v. Malebranche,1 1 4 an Oregon worker was injured on
an escalator while attending an employer-sponsored conference in
Florida, rather than while working in the state. She collected Oregon
workers compensation benefits and then sued the allegedly negligent
co-worker and employer in tort. The court in that case applied Oregon
law, which did not permit such suits. The court noted, however, that
the result would likely be the same under Florida law. It cited Flor-
ida's "strong public policy of shielding an employer from liability for
injuries for which the employee received workers' compensation" but
also pointed out that "Oregon has an even stronger public policy of
shielding employers from liability."115 Thus, "given Plaintiffs minimal
contact with Florida as compared to Oregon's strong public policy of
shielding employers from liability, the fact that Plaintiff has already
chosen to participate in Oregon's workers' compensation system, and
that Plaintiffs employment relationship . . . is centered in Oregon, the
Court finds Oregon has a more significant relationship to the instant
action.116
Although the courts in these three cases applied varying meth-
odologies, all three of them agreed that the employees were limited to
worker compensation recoveries.
X. TURNING JUDICIAL PRACTICE INTO LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The analysis above demonstrates how consistently courts
choose the applicable law for many Florida tort cases. What is most
inconsistent is the method they choose to get there. They tend to ar-
rive at the same place via different routes, thus making the choice of
law decision much more complex, unpredictable, and expensive than
necessary. It is time to jettison the Second Restatement and replace it
with something more user-friendly, more consistent, and more
predictable.
A new approach to choice of law need not represent an entirely
different approach. One can draft rules in many areas, based on what
the Florida courts have already done.
Adopting rules based on these cases will facilitate choice of law
decisions. Although adopting a rule sacrifices thorough analysis of in-
114. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2005).




terests and policies, courts rarely engage in such analysis anyway,
even though many scholars would wish otherwise. Adopting rules
rather than Restatement principles or standards inevitably results in
less analysis. But less analysis might be considered preferable to the
current bad analysis demonstrated by our courts, particularly when
the new approach offers predictability and consistency.
In those areas not clearly addressed by the state's common law,
one might look to the recent efforts of other states for additional gui-
dance. As noted above, two states have already adopted their own
choice of law statutes. Louisiana adopted its scheme in 1992, though it
has not led to the predictability for which it was drafted.117 That could
be because its provisions rely too heavily, not on rules, but on the same
sort of standard that makes the Second Restatement so uncertain. In-
stead of the Restatement's "most significant relationship" test, the
Louisiana code provides some rules but generally requires application
of "the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired
if its law were not applied." Like the Restatement's reference to vari-
ous factors, the Louisiana Code requires reference to a variety of
contacts and policies."1s Its strongest feature is that it provides for a
fairly simple analysis for issues related to standards of conduct and
safety, and it adopts the common domicile rule for loss distribution
issues.
Oregon's most recent effort appears to warrant closer attention.
Effective January 1, 2010, the statute borrows heavily from the Louisi-
ana effort 19 without incorporating the "seriously impaired" standard.
Its rules are straightforward with appropriate escape devices for the
exceptional case. Such a statutory scheme could easily be employed in
Florida, relying for primary guidance on the state's thirty years of judi-
cial decisions.
Under Oregon's statute, courts would apply Oregon law in ac-
tions against an owner of real property located in Oregon for injury on
that property "arising out of conduct that occurs in Oregon."120 Oregon
law would also apply to "[aictions between an employer and an em-
ployee who is primarily employed in Oregon that arise out of injury
117. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 LA. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Russell J.
Weintraub, Courts Flailing in the Waters of the Louisiana Conflicts Code: Not Waving but
Drowning, 60 LA. L. REV. 1365 (2000). For a broader discussion of Lousiana's effort, see
Wiegand, supra note 8, at 13-16.
118. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (2010).
119. The similarities are not surprising, given that Professor Symeon Symeonides
played a key role in the drafting of both.
120. Or. Rev. Stat. § 15.430(5)(2011).
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that occurs in Oregon" and to "la]ctions for professional malpractice
arising from services rendered entirely in Oregon" by Oregon-licensed
professionals. 121 There is a separate section for product liability, as
well as a common domicile rule. Additional rules apply to specific cir-
cumstances, and the statute has a default provision when none of the
rules apply. In such a case, the courts are instructed to apply "the law
of the state whose contacts with the parties and the dispute and whose
policies on the disputed issues make application of the state's law the
most appropriate for those issues." Second Restatement-like principles
guide this decision. For example, courts must consider states that
have a relevant contact with the dispute, and must consider the needs
and policies of each of those states.122
The point here is not that Oregon has figured out the most sen-
sible choice of law approach. Rather, it is that the legislative scheme
provides far more guidance and far less room for arbitrariness than the
Second Restatement. It is likely that Florida courts would reach the
same or similar results as Oregon courts will do under their new ap-
proach. Why? Because in most cases, the methodology does not seem
to matter, particularly when it is properly applied so seldom.
Florida is ready for a similar effort. Relying on the patterns
discussed in this article and incorporating additional rules and stan-
dards will lead to a choice of law statute that will minimize this area of
uncertainty now and in the future. It will also honor the decisions
made by Florida judges over the past thirty-two years as they strug-
gled to utilize the complicated Second Restatement analysis.
121. Or. Rev. Stat. § 15.430(6), (7)(2011).
122. Or. Rev. Stat. § 15.445 (2011).
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APPENDIx A
Choice-of-Law Decisions Involving Tort Issues, 1980 - present
(Listed by court and in reverse chronological order)
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485
F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2007)
Nelson v. Freightliner, LLC, 154 Fed. Appx. 98 (11th Cir. 2005)
Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292
(11th Cir. 2003)
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
1999)
Trumpet Vine Investments, N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc. 92
F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 1996)
Digioia v. H. Koch & Sons, 944 F.2d 809 (11th Cir. 1991)
Judge v. American Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1990)
Shapiro v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1116 (11th Cir. 1990)
Garcia v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 841 F.2d 1062 (11th Cir.
1988)
Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 1407 (11th
Cir. 1984)
United States District Court
Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33181 (M.D.
Fla. 2012)
Schippers v. United States of America, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136980
(M.D. Fla. 2011)
Del Istmo Assurance Corp. v. Platon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129906
(S.D. Fla. 2011)
Zelma v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123933 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
Mardegan v. Mylan, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89787 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
Oginski v. Paragon Props., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88254 (S.D. Fla.
2011)
Learning Connections, Inc. v. Kaufman, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80080
(M.D. Fla. 2011)
In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80447 (S.D.
Fla. 2011)
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Costa v. Kerzner Int'l Resorts, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66921 (S.D.
Fla. 2011)
Canon Latin Am., Inc. v. Lantech, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6267 (S.D.
Fla. 2011)
Chapman v. Depuy Ortho., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
Lewandowski v. Bayer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128951 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
Pearlman v. MTV Networks, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88873 (M.D. Fla.
2010)
In re Banco Santander Sec.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D.
Fla. 2010)
O'Donnell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34394 (S.D.
Fla. 2010)
Pierson v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33974
(M.D. Fla. 2010)
Estate of Miller v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(M.D. Fla. 2009)
De Leon v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106845 (M.D.
Fla. 2009)
Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., 637 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D.
Fla. 2009)
In re United States Sugar, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
Estate of Miller v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1235
(M.D. Fla. 2009)
In re Nationsrent Rental Fee Litigation, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23662
(S.D. Fla. 2009)
Rashid v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102676 (M.D.
Fla. 2008)
Auto Internet Marketing, Inc. v. Targus Information Corp., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98595 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
Campbell v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 81121 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
Cohen v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64144 (S.D.
Fla. 2008)
Valentino v. Bond, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63485 (N.D. Fla. 2008)
Duckett v. Cable News Network LLLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88667
(M.D. Fla. 2008)
Cohen v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 617 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
Castellanos v. Pfizer, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42586 (S.D. Fla.
2008)
Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Technologies, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31457 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
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Bravo v. Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9787 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. 798, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96347 (S.D.
Fla. 2007)
Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1236
(M.D. Fla. 2007)
Lydia Security Monitoring, Inc., v. Alarm One, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62087 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
Ziino v. Baker, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61616 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla.
2007)
Topp, Inc. v. Uniden America Corp., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (S.D. Fla.
2007)
Gulf Group Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d
1253 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
Int'l. Star Registry v. Omnipoint Marketing, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 2d
1015 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
Hendricks v. Smartvideo Technologies, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1219
(M.D. Fla. 2007)
Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59368
(S.D. Fla. 2006)
Border Collie Rescue, Inc., v. Ryan, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Fla.
2006)
Potts v. Budget Rent A Car System, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27536
(N.D. Fla. 2005)
Medina v. American Airlines, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18916 (S.D.
Fla. 2005)
CFJ Mfr, L.P. v. Sweetworks, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33953 (M.D.
Fla. 2005)
Motmanco, Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33965
(M.D. Fla. 2005)
Plath v. Malebranche, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
Cargill, Inc. v. Zeigler Bros., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30758 (S.D.
Fla. 2004)
Estate of Miller v. Ford Motor Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30811 (M.D.
Fla. 2004)
Rivas v. Ford Motor Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7535 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
Altadis USA Inc. v. NPR, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
Boromei v. U.S., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27859 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
Walker v. Paradise Grand Hotel, LTD., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25660
(S.D. Fla. 2003)
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Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27693
(S.D. Fla. 2003)
Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. U.S., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (M.D. Fla.
2002)
Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, LLC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28085 (N.D.
Fla. 2002)
O'Keefe v. Darnell, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
Montgomery v. New Piper Aircraft, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 221 (S.D. Fla.
2001)
Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla.
2001)
Northland Cas. Co. v. HBE Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Fla.
2001)
Florida Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 135 F. Supp. 2d
1271 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
Minor v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12542 (M.D. Fla.
2000)
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